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The international system has been under the influence of United States hegemony since
the fall of the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century; however, in the past several years the
strength of the hegemon has come into question. With the strength of the United States
hegemony in question, the possibility of successors also comes into question. Although no
current, clear-cut proof exists that China has the full potential to surpass the United States as the
hegemon, China has shown the most potential of any single state. Most of this potential is due to
China’s large and ever-growing economy. With the possibility of American decline and Sino
power rising, a fresh look needs to be taken at Power Transition Theory (PTT).
Regardless if China, or another state power, one day surpasses the United States as
hegemon, transitioning away from a unipole has never occurred in the current international
system. This requires special scrutiny when determining the possible outcomes of a transition. A
new outlook on this theory is necessary because of the dawn of the Cyber Age. Cyber security
and cyber warfare are going to play a major role in determining the results of the transition. The
possibility of conflict revolves mostly around the how the challenger favors the current status
quo, as dictated by the hegemon, or how willing the current hegemon is to concede its global
status to the challenger. Previously, considering this possibility of conflict looked upon the status
of each state’s conventional military power: conventional weapons, man power, nuclear
weapons. However, in the Cyber Age, conventional military power is not the only power that
must be considered. China and the United States are two of the states that are most accused of
international cyber attacks. Although never proven, the United States has been accused of
helping to orchestrate the first-known intentional cyber attack, the Stuxnet virus, a topic that will
be later discussed. However, both states are accused of daily cyber espionage against one another
and others in the international system. This new and evolving power must be taken into
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consideration when determining the outcome of an international power transition. This paper will
argue that these cyber attacks will decrease the probability of an armed conflict and will be cause
for a more peaceful transition. This paper will examine the effects of cyber warfare on PTT, as
well as take into consideration possible other factors that could cause for a more peaceful
transition. Along with the consideration of the effects of cyber warfare on PTT, a necessary look
must be made at the effects of cyber warfare on Just War Theory (JWT). I will examine both of
these effects as they concern the overall Sino-American relationship and the outcome of a
possible power transition.
The current Sino-American relationship has most recently been defined by their
economic trading partnership. According to federal census information, China is, and has been,
the number one state that the United States has imported from, as well as the number one state
that the United States has a trade deficit with.1 This economic partnership mostly stems from the
U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 signed by then President Bill Clinton. The act allowed China
to surpass Mexico as the United States’ number two trading partner by 20062, and by November
2015, China has surpassed Canada to become the United States’ number one trading partner.3
Similarly, the United States has moved into the position of number one trading partner for
China.4 If only viewed through an economic lens, the Sino-American relationship is very strong
and would seem to deter any sort of conflict in a power transition. If a conflict were to occur,
both states would take significant losses economically. The United States would lose nearly 28%
of its imported goods,5 and China would lose approximately $423 billion or approximately 19%
of its overall revenue from exports. This also doesn’t take into consideration possible embargoes
from each state’s military alliances, which would only further the economic losses for each state.
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Although each state would take a significant hit economically during the conflict, special
consideration needs to be taken of the large trade deficit that the United States has with China.
The possibility of conflict is highest during a power transition when the challenger
reaches the condition of parity. The period of parity is defined as beginning when the challenger
develops more than 80% of the resources of the dominant power and ends when the challenger
exceeds the dominant power by 20%.6 The growing trade imbalance of the United States is
beginning to signify an increase in Chinese ability to produce its own many of its own resources.
The United States at the end of 2015 had a trade imbalance of $365.7 billion with China.
Although the United States does have a trade imbalance with its top eleven trade partners, the
next highest imbalance is only 7$4.2 billion to Germany.7 However, the trade imbalance with
China has grown much more rapidly than any other state. If China continues to grow this trade
imbalance, it may eventually enter the period of parity in which the United States would need to
take a serious consideration of its trade imbalance if the state desired to maintain its position as
hegemon.
However, there is other speculation that parity and overall economic prowess may not
play as large a part in causing a power struggle. Preceding the First World War, the United States
passed the United Kingdom in terms of the world’s greatest economy.8 Nonetheless, the United
States did not become a great power in the international system until after the Second World
War, a conflict that the United States and the United Kingdom were on the same side of. Part of
this could be due to the United Kingdom’s vast empire. But once the United Kingdom became
the net borrower of the United States, the British Empire only lasted approximately another
quarter of a century.9 A similar effect could possibly occur if China surpasses the United States.
United States has already become the net borrower of China; could the United States already be
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in a position of decline without realizing it? The United Kingdom still continued through WWI,
the interwar period, and most of WWII as the dominant power in the world, even though the
system was more multipolar in nature than a hegemonic system. Other factors could have played
a serious role in this as well, such as the United States’ position of isolationism. The United
States only entered WWI as a necessity to ensure the survival of Europe as a whole, and only
entered WWII because of the preventive Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Although China was
involved in an ideological proxy war with the United States during the Korean and Vietnamese
Wars, since the end of the Cold War, China has mostly focused on economic relationships, not
getting overly involved in conflicts in the Middle East or elsewhere. In fact most of the Chinese
involvement, even during the Cold War, was based around the nation-building problems it faces
today, not international conflicts. The current Sino-American situation shares these aspects with
the previous British-American power transition; however, a major difference in the current
situation is ideology.
The British-American transition occurred smoothly between the two countries. Although
both countries were involved in a conflict during the time of transition, the two powers were
clearly fighting on the same side of WWII. Many factors of WWII could have played into the
transition. Britain came out of the war severely weakened and could not contest the United States
even if it had wanted to maintain its position of power. Additionally, ideology played a major
role in this transition. Although Britain likely did not want to give up its position of power, the
United States had been a longtime ally of the British and shared the same core ideology of
democracy. However in the possible Sino-American transition ideological similarities do not
exist. The two states do share the strong economic ties, but China is still a communist country
with a very opaque government and a highly-contested recent history of human rights violations;
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all of which go against a core national interest of the United States. According the Robert Art,
the United States has six core national interests: protect the homeland from attacks; keep the
peace amongst Eurasian powers; preserve a stable supply and access to oil; preserve an open
international economic order; spread democracy, the rule of law, and protect human rights; and
avert climate change.10 It is highly unlikely the United States would willingly allow for China to
attempt to spread its ideology even if the United States was weakened by a conflict. Although
there are now international organizations, such as the United Nations, that attempt to remedy
these human rights violations, it is unlikely any of them could successfully deter against a
unipole, as seen by the lack of effect of the United Nations’ condemnation of the United States
conflict in Iraq in 2003.
Although China and the United States have enjoyed a strong trading partnership, other
aspects of international relations have not produced as strong of a relationship, which may cause
China to attempt to change the status quo regardless of economic ties. One major area of
dissidence is China’s disagreement with the United States’ policies in the Middle East. China has
disagreed with the United States’ involvement in the Middle East since the early 1990s. It is a
general belief in China that the United States only got involved in the Middle East to extend its
hegemony and secure a steady supply of oil. Most recently China accused the United States of
this after the 2003 United States backing of regime change in Iraq.11 China believes that the 2003
invasion of Iraq and subsequent ousting of Saddam Hussein were merely a ploy to create another
democratic government in the Middle East, giving the United States more control and power
over the region. The United States has vehemently denied these accusations and has some
credibility to do so, as the number one state that the United States imports isn’t a member of the
Middle East or even of OPEC. The number one exporter of oil to the United States is its
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neighbor to the North, Canada. China on the other hand relies heavily on the Middle East to
obtain its oil. Saudi Arabia comes in at number one for China on the oil imports list. Although
Saudi Arabia does come in as number two on the United States list of oil imports, it only makes
up for 11% of total oil imports. Canada makes up 40% of total oil imports, and the top five is
rounded out by Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia making up 9%, 8%, and 4% respectively.12
China does import a similar amount of oil from Saudi Arabia, approximately 16%, but relies on
the Middle East as a region much more heavily. The countries of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Iran,
UAE, and Kuwait make up a combined 51% of China’s oil imports. China’s other major sources
of oil come from Angola, 13%, Russia, 11%, and Venezuela, 4%.13 With such a heavy reliance
on Middle East oil, China needs to have a serious stake in the Middle East, more so than the
United States.
If China is to enter the period of parity, it needs to ensure that it has control over the
resources that it desires. If the United States continues to obtain this foothold in the Middle East,
China may run itself dry of oil. As of 2015, China was producing approximately 4.25 million
barrels per day with a consumption of almost 11million barrels per day.14 Simple math shows
that China is importing to make up approximately 6.75 million barrels of oil per day. If China
were to lose its source of Middle East oil because of a conflict with the United States, it would
lose the aforementioned 51% of imported oil and would fall approximately 3.37 million barrels
of oil short per day. Although the United States has been involved in the Middle East for the past
couple decades, it does not mean that the Middle East welcomes the United States. As a region,
they have a mere 30% favorability view.15 However, because the two states have invested
themselves so heavily in the region, whether politically or economically, the Middle East will
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likely become a region of contention between China and the United States in coming years if
China wants to become the hegemon.
According to Alterman and Garver, China has two goals in the Middle East, expand
friendly cooperation with all countries and obtain resources (mainly oil) and export markets.16
Both of these goals can likely be accomplished through economic relationships. China has taken
similar steps on the continent of Africa. China recognized the growing financial crisis that was
affecting the West and took this time to make massive deals and transactions with African
countries. In 2008, Beijing provided a stimulus package of $570 billion to the continent.17
Although this stimulus package only strengthened Africa’s dependence on commodities, it
provided the necessary money to industrialize and increase mining production of the minerals
that China required. By 2009, China’s largest portion of FDI in Africa was mining at 29.2% of
total FDI.18 This investment into the continent has provided resources and political power for
China.
China could very easily duplicate this process in the Middle East. The financial crisis in
the West has since become much less of a problem, but China could still easily capitalize in the
Middle East. As mentioned before, the Middle East’s approval rating of the United States sits at
a measly 30%, and China has already begun taking advantage of this. Unlike the United States
which has been taking action in the Middle East for the past several decades to attempt to spread
democracy and end the reign of dictators in the region, China has simply just had to verbally
condemn the United States’ actions to gain influence. China has denounced these actions by
saying that it opposes outside states having influence and interventions in the region.19 If China is
capable of duplicating the process from Africa, it will likely look to Iraq first. Iraq has the fourth
largest proven petroleum deposits, but the oil fields are underutilized.20 Iraq does not have the
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technological capabilities or funds to drill at full potential. China could easily duplicate the
African process to aide Iraq in drilling for the oil and obtaining a vital resource for itself.
Although this would only make China more reliant on Middle East oil, it would most likely have
a much higher approval rating than the United States in the country.
China, however, must be very careful if it attempts to assert itself into the Middle East.
The Middle East could very easily become a flashpoint between the United States and China,
which would hurt China in two different ways. First, the United States has proven since the end
of the Second World War that it is willing to bog itself down in conflicts over ideology. The
Chinese should be aware of this because of the ideological proxy war in Korea that had the
United States and China on opposite sides. In recent years, the United States has proven its
willingness to continue this trend after the ten-year stint in Iraq for the spread of an ideology and
the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Second, China has to realize that a majority of its
influence in the region is because of the stance it took on the United States’ interventions. If
China goes back on its position of no outside intervention, the Middle East could very quickly
view China in the same light that the region views the United States, which would set China back
even further.
China has proven that the Middle East is not its main concern. When President Bush and
the rest of Washington, D.C., called on Beijing to assist in the War on Terror in the early 2000s,
China attempted to leverage the situation. China originally said it would support the coalition if
the United States provided concessions for Taiwan.21 One of China’s main goals currently is its
regional influence in the Southeast Pacific, but the main problem lies with the United States’
Seventh Naval Fleet stationed mainly in Japan. The United States pushed its way across the
Pacific during WWII to fight the Japanese and has not removed itself from the region since.
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According to the official fact sheet of the Seventh Naval Fleet, its purpose is to “maintain a
continuous forward presence in the Indo-Asia Pacific, providing security and stability in the
region.”18 The Seventh Fleet is also the largest of the United States Navy’s forward-deployed
fleets, which allows it to quickly react to possible conflicts in the region. China has reacted to
this in recent years by creating “anti-access/area-denial” strategy to limit the naval power of the
United States.22 The strategy is to prevent the United States from even being able to get its fleet
close enough to China’s mainland to use its aircraft, let alone any sort of troop or naval
bombardments. China is also attempting to increase its maritime power in the area. Although the
United States has official diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and not
Taiwan, it is still a major issue of tension between the two powers and could be another possible
flashpoint.
One such instance of this tension in the South China Seas was the incident involving the
USNS Impeccable, a small ship that is used to detect and track submarines. In 2009 the USNS
Impeccable was stationed approximately 75 miles off the coast of the Chinese island Yulin to
monitor movements of a new class of Chinese nuclear submarines.23 The USNS Impeccable
began to be harassed by Chinese ships even as it began to leave the area. The Chinese attempted
to capture the towed sonar array of the USNS Impeccable until the United States sent a destroyer
to the scene to escort the USNS Impeccable. The United States claimed that the ship was
operating outside Chinese territorial waters. China claimed that foreign military ships were only
allowed in the economic boundaries (approximately 200 hundred miles from shore) if their
business was innocent in nature, and China did not consider the USNS Impeccable to be
conducting innocent procedures.24 Although this event may not have escalated into a naval
conflict, this incident could have escalated tensions that could have affected political and
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economic relationships between the two states. The amount of surveillance the United States and
China conduct on one another is reminiscent of the United States and the Soviet Union during
the Cold War. Regardless, China risked a lot by being so aggressive towards a surveillance-only
ship. Although intelligence is very important in the military world, how much would China risk
if it had been a United States ship with stronger military capabilities in its waters? And how
much would China risk when it comes to Taiwan?
Overall the United States has been very critical of Chinese nation building. China has
multiple concerns when it comes to unifying as one. China’s main concerns for unification
include Taiwan, Tibet, and the Muslim Uighurs. The United States officially switched its
recognition of the Chinese government from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China on
January 1, 1979. On this date the United States officially terminated the Sino-American Mutual
Defense Treaty as well, since the treaty was created with the government in Taipei not the
government in Beijing. Ever since then, there has still been speculation on whether or not the
United States would defend Taiwan if China attempted to invade the island. On April 10th, 1979,
President Carter signed into law the Taiwan Relations Act that includes provisions for the United
States to provide Taiwan with “arms of a defensive character […] to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capacity.”25 This does not call for direct protection if there is an invasion
of Taiwan, but it also does not specify that the United States will not provide defense against
China. As the hegemon, the United States has interfered in similar capacities elsewhere and
could very easily do so in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Taiwan isn’t the only area of nation building that has brought criticism to China. China
also has a problem with Tibet and the Muslim Uighurs. China illegally invaded Tibet in 1950
and has held it under occupation ever since. The West has since recognized Chinese sovereignty
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over Tibet, but many charges of human rights violations have been made including genocide,
which the United States and the West have intervened to stop before in other conflicts. China
also has a major ethnic problem in the province of Xinjiang. Culturally the Uighurs that make up
a majority of this province relate more to Central Asian countries than to China. In recent years
there has been a large spark in violence amongst the Uighurs and the Han Chinese who are
moving into the region. Many of the Uighurs claim discrimination, and a separatist movement
has begun. China’s nation building problem is a major one, and if the human rights violations
continue, the West may attempt to interfere diplomatically, which could spark a conflict and a
possible power transition.
A major hurdle that China would need to cross on its path through power transition
would be the technological gap with the United States. Although China is moving closer and
closer to surpassing the United States economically, it is merely exporting these new
technologies, not creating new ones. The economic prowess of China has not translated into
military prowess and technological prowess as it once did. According to World Bank data from
2013, the United States turned in $128 billion worth of receipts for innovation technologies;
whereas, China turned in less than $1 billion worth.26 Another indicator of technological prowess
is the number of triadic patents; these are patents that are registered in the United States, Europe,
and Japan. In 2012, the United States registered nearly 14,000 patents; whereas, China registered
fewer than 2,000 patents.27 Other indicators include examining the number of articles in science
and engineering that appear in the top one percent of citations and number of Nobel Prizes won
in science categories. The United States accounts for almost half of the papers in the top one
percent of citations, eight times more than China, and has 114 Nobel Prizes in science since
1990, while China has two.28
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Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth in their article “The Once and Future
Superpower” use these facts to argue that China is not approaching the United States
economically and will not surpass the United States as the hegemon. However, these facts do not
necessarily correlate with degrees of technological prowess. The authors fail to consider the role
of globalization and how it affects the spread of new technologies. Although globalization does
not affect the spread of all technologies, due to the classified nature of many government
technologies, it can account for the spread of many everyday technologies. Globalization and
technology go hand-in-hand. Globalization leads to the spread to the spread of technology, and
better technology leads to more globalization. Much of this occurs not through state governments
but through transnational corporations that operate outside governments. Although these
technologies may not originate inside China, this does not mean China will not eventually obtain
these technologies.
A major edge the United States has over China is its military prowess. The United States
has had the strongest military and largest military expenditure for the past several decades, due
mostly to its arms race with the former Soviet Union. China is catching up in quality of military
technologies due to globalization. As stated, globalization does not help the spread of classified
technologies of other states, but it does help the spread of technology that can be used to obtain
said classified technologies. Cyber espionage and cyber warfare have revolutionized the
international sphere, and the effects of this have yet to be considered in many International
Relations theories. Thus far this paper has examined the relationship between the United States
and China and how it affects the current method of examination for PTT; however, PTT was
written several decades ago before this technological revolution. Cyber espionage and cyber
warfare have already had profound effects on the international sphere as a whole, but its full
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power has yet to be seen. Similarly the effects have yet to be seen on PTT. The abilities of cyber
warfare allow for the curtailing of many conventional military operations and could potentially
lead to the mitigation of conflict in a power transition scenario. Many arguments have been made
that new world economic ties and military capabilities, such as nuclear warheads and democracy,
have led to sustained peace, which would also affect the possible conflict in PTT, but cyber
warfare also needs to be considered.
The capabilities of cyber warfare are countless: “everything from online protests to the
stealing of internet secrets to cyber sabotage of nuclear research to battlefield acts of war.”29 As
the world becomes more dependent on new technologies, the capabilities of cyber warfare will
become endless. Militaries, utility grids, classified documents, identities, and countless more
areas of our lives are stored or controlled digitally. For example, the United States has been
deemed very difficult to invade due to the two large oceans on either side of its borders. But this
only takes into consideration ground troops. Another consideration is the ability for other states
to prelude invasions through cyber warfare. The ability to wipe out power grids, missile
defenses, and opposing military capabilities makes such a ground invasion possible. Although
countries like the United States definitely have cybersecurity to counterattack such measures, the
possibility of being attacked is much more real.
The capabilities of cyber warfare can be seen through the 2010 discovery of the Stuxnet
virus. The virus is believed to have originated from a joint American-Israeli operation. The virus
was the most advanced malware known. The virus was active for approximately two years as the
code dictated its own deletion on June 24th, 2012. The virus was created to attack only specific
computers and was only spread to a set amount of computers. The virus was more than likely
transferred through USB flash drives. Once inserted into a computer, the virus would search for a
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Windows operating system; if found the next step was to look for either Siemens PCS7, WINCC,
or Step7, all different software applications with industrial applications. Once done checking
these criteria, the virus would spread to up to three computers on the same server. The target of
the virus is believed to have been the Bushehr or Natanz nuclear facilities in Iran. Although the
true target has never been confirmed, it is believed the virus was successful in attacking the
Natanz nuclear power plant causing centrifuges to vibrate rapidly, thus damaging them and
requiring replacements. The virus was successful in that it reached and destroyed centrifuges;
however, it did not actually stop any uranium enrichment in Iran. The true effects of the Stuxnet
virus are in the proven capabilities of cyber warfare. No malware has ever been as effective or
secretive as this virus. By limiting the computers affected, the malware was much harder to
detect and allowed for the completion of its mission. Similarly the fact that the Stuxnet virus is
only believed to be of American-Israeli origin and has not been proven, shows how difficult is to
defend against these types of attacks. Cyber warfare is silent but can be just as effective as
conventional warfare.
The Stuxnet virus is a specific example of a SCADA attack. SCADA stands for
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, a fancy term that means it is a type of industrial
control system, which in turn simply means it monitors and controls physical industrial
processes. SCADA servers are much more customized and require more complex codes and
viruses,30 hence the advanced nature of the Stuxnet Virus. SCADA attacks could easily target
electrical power grids, communications, and the flow of petroleum.31 Although no known
SCADA attack on a power grid has occurred, the effects of such an attack can be seen in the
2003 major blackout of a large portion of the eastern United States and part of Canada. The
blackout was caused by a chain of events that started with a simple software failure at a local
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power plant that led to a local outage. The outage led to a strain on other local power plants that
caused lines to sag and come into contact with trees, which in turn caused these lines to fail as
well. After this the entire state of Ohio began drawing power from Michigan. Michigan’s power
grid was unable to sustain the load and began to fail in turn which led to power being drawn
from more stations along the east coast causing failure after failure. In the end, 256 power plants
were offline, and 55 million customers were without power.32 A simple software failure and
human failure to communicate led to one of the largest blackouts in history. If an attack on this
grid had been intentional, much more damage could have been accomplished and loss of life
could have occurred, especially if other utilities had been targeted as well. Although SCADA
systems are highly customized, it is not difficult to obtain information on these systems, and
attacks on such systems could cripple a state without sending in one ground troop.
Cyber warfare also allows covert activities to be done in a brand new manner. Covert
activities no longer completely rely on infiltrating foreign governments by use of humans or
double agents. Stealing of classified documents, eavesdropping, and denial of service attacks are
some examples of cyber espionage. Although China appears to have been very successful in
recent years in stealing highly classified military secrets, cyber espionage can also target large
corporations. China is known to have cloned products, especially military products; they have
cloned “bleeding edge U.S. aircraft including the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and
Northrop Grumman X-47B unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV),”33 as well as several land
vehicles and small arms. China also clones products on much smaller scales: sandals,
smartphones, alcoholic beverage, even some stores and restaurants. Cyber espionage has allowed
for all of this. Although globalization would likely have led to some of this duplication, cyber
espionage has allowed for much quicker advancement and creation of these products. Militarily
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cloning was very difficult before cyber espionage due to needing the actual product to duplicate
rather than retrofitting older products.
Another category of cyber warfare is Computer Network Attacks (CNAs). CNAs are
defined as “actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and
networks themselves.”34 CNAs are the attacks that everyday citizens often consider when
thinking of a hacker. Although hackers can create CNAs on a very small scale, the real danger
comes from the capabilities of the state or state-backed entities. Along with a larger scale of
attacks, the attacking state would likely “go for the throat,”35 similar to a conventional attack.
When non-state backed hackers commit CNAs, they only compromise the target in order to own
it but do not take the full steps that may be required in actual warfare. For example, a hacker may
break into a missile tracking system to gain access, but the hacker would not destroy or render
the tracking system useless, unless it was a true act of war.
Cyber warfare also has profound effects on conflicts of conventional warfare. Cyber
warfare can affect conventional warfare through two different categories: physically and
electronically. Physically, cyber warfare effects troops on the ground. Some examples include
the reliance of troops on new-age electronic technologies, supplies, and communications. Cyber
attacks could occur against any or all of these categories which would render the troops to be less
effective. A cyber attack that takes out an enemy’s targeting systems or weapons leaves them
unable to fight; take out their supply lines and they are unable to survive; take out their
communications and they are suddenly alone. All of these are extremely detrimental to troops on
the ground. However, these troops on the ground can prevent cyber attacks as well. Physical
attacks can be carried out on power grids, communication lines, and other required processes to
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keep computers powered and running. Without these the enemy may not be able to successfully
utilize their cyber warfare capabilities.
The category of electronic warfare, just like physical warfare, can be affected by cyber
warfare and can affect cyber warfare. Electronic warfare can be considered a subset of
conventional warfare but is separate from the physical attacks.36 Electronic warfare consists of
attacks that take place on the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic warfare can render cyber
capabilities useless through the use of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). EMPs destroy
electronics, which would also render much of an enemy’s infrastructure useless without a single
physical blow. However EMPs and other technologies are themselves electronic, meaning that
these weapons are just as susceptible to cyber attack.
Although cyber warfare is relatively new, states have already created defenses against
these types of weapons. Many of these defenses fall into the realm of cybersecurity. States have
people actively working to defend against these attacks. Whether its preventively, such as
building firewalls, or reactively, such as stopping an occurring attack or espionage, cybersecurity
is an ongoing occurrence that does not contain a method of deterrence like conventional warfare.
Unfortunately, cybersecurity does not defend against conventional attacks against cyber
capabilities. States have mainly two option to defend their cyber capabilities from conventional
attacks, redundant infrastructure and hardening of facilities and equipment.
Redundant infrastructure consists of three types of backup sites: cold, warm, and hot.
Cold sites are nothing more than a facility in which to renew operations. Utilities may need to be
turned on, backup copies of data created and transported, building systems, etc.37 Cold backup
sites exist mainly in case of conditions that can be seen far into the future as it takes weeks or
more to bring cold sites online. Warm backup sites are the next step up. Warm sites may have

19

some portion of the software and hardware as well as some systems and some connectivity, but
backups would still need to be transported to the site and some configurations would need to take
place.38 It would only take a matter of days to bring a warm site online making these much more
effective in case of a sudden attacks. Lastly, hot backup sites are completely redundant to an
active site. This allows for almost zero data loss in case of an attack. Hot backup sites only
require the personnel needed to run the site to begin operations, which can usually happen in a
matter of hours.39 All of these backup sites serve their own purposes, but overall each keeps the
state’s cyber capabilities protected and ready to resume operation in case of a conventional
attack.
Facility and equipment hardening is similar to creating firewalls in cybersecurity.
Hardening against conventional attacks is used to attempt to stop destruction of a state’s cyber
capabilities. In general hardening of structures and equipment refers to protection against EMPs.
Although conventional attacks also include small arms and bombs, the structures that store cyber
capabilities are generally already prepared for these types of attacks due to normal military codes
and planning. EMPs however can very easily pass through these layers of concrete. Other basic
protection includes fences and gates to prevent unauthorized entry, locks, traps, laminated glass
windows, and the aforementioned structural reinforcements.40 However, to protect the equipment
itself requires much more advanced techniques. These techniques normally consist of shielding,
faraday cages, waveguides, and different filters, to shield the equipment.41 Overall these
techniques simply alter the electronic currents from EMPs saving the equipment.
Another major question in cybersecurity and defense of cyber capabilities is whether to
act reactively or proactively. The cybersecurity and protection methods against conventional
attacks just mentioned fall into the category of acting reactively. These techniques fall under the
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category of traditional warfare. Acting proactively may not fall into the paradigm of traditional
warfare, but yet again brings up the debate of preventive versus preemptive warfare. As
mentioned cyber warfare has yet to be considered as factors in many theories of International
Relations and JWT is one of them. Much research can be done on the effects of cyber warfare on
JWT, but this paper will only examine what is necessary to be considered in a power transition.
Many proactive attacks can be made in advance, some even years in advance through both
software and hardware. These attacks could easily be considered preventive and illegal, which is
why JWT must be examined.
The Talinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, published in
2013, created rules or guidelines for basics of how cyber warfare can and cannot be conducted.
The main conclusions from this manual are:
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Overall these key points show that cyber operations can be considered a use of force and the
similar rules can be applied as they are applied to conventional attacks. Specific sections of JWT
can also be examined for amore in depth examination as well.
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The categories of Jus ad Bellum, which is the section of JWT that discusses if a conflict
is justly initiated, can be used to show how cyber warfare will affect the possibility of a conflict
in a power transition. Jus ad Bellum can be broken down into five categories: Right Authority,
Right Intention, Probability of Success, Last Resort, and Proportionality. Cyber warfare could
have a major effect on PTT, and it will most likely lead to either a mitigation or prevention of a
conventional conflict between states.
Right authority of cyber attacks is difficult because according to right authority only
states have the legal authority to wage war. Many nonstate actors have committed acts of war,
i.e. ISIS, but cyber warfare allows even more people the capability to commit acts of war. By
simply having a computer and some coding, independent actors could easily commit similar acts
as a state would. Right authority, however, comes from national and international laws, treaties,
and institutions. A major problem with this is that many states are not members of the same
international institutions and many have very different national laws when it comes to the case of
cyber warfare.43 In a possible power transition conflict, one state could consider themselves to
comply with right authority for cyber warfare attacks; whereas, another state’s laws do not agree.
Right intention in JWT states that one can only use or threaten force for a just cause. The
question is: how just is cyber warfare? The Stuxnet virus, if used correctly, simply attempted to
stop uranium production in Iran, but does this justify a cyber attack in response? A large scale
SCADA attack, for example, on a power grid could probably illicit a cyber attack in response,
but does simple espionage illicit the same response? Or does it simply require diplomatic
consequences? In a power transition this question will be the most difficult to answer. Right
intention will be extremely hard to answer, possibly deterring a state from initiating cyber
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attacks. Without proper knowledge of how to answer this question, it will likely be difficult to
understand how the victimized state will respond.
Probability of success discusses that force must not be used in a futile war. Many of these
again scenarios will not be simple to answer. The major question occurs what is considered a use
of force when it comes to cyber warfare? For example again, the Stuxnet Virus did not harm any
human life; it only attempted to stop the production of uranium in Iran, which produces the
question: is this a use of force and does this even need to be applied to JWT?44 In a power
transition, probability of success is a major factor. If a challenger enters a conflict with the
current superpower, it has to make sure it is able to win the conflict. Due to the former
superiority of the hegemon, this will likely be very difficult to determine. Similarly if a former
superpower attempts to start a conflict with the new hegemon, is it actually capable of winning
the conflict? Due to the difficult nature of determining probability of success, it is likely that
states will use cyber attacks against one another. Since the use of force is difficult to apply to
cyber attacks, this could very easily replace conventional conflict.
Last resort is also very difficult due to the current definition of use of force. In power
transition, last resort is very important. According to PTT, a conflict normally occurs because a
challenger is unhappy with the status quo, or a former superpower is attempting to regain its spot
as the hegemon. Neither of these are fit the right intention category and would likely need
extensive diplomatic negotiations before a just conflict could even be remotely considered.
Again cyber attacks will likely mitigate an actual conflict. Both the challenger and the hegemon
likely will have the cyber capabilities to cripple the other’s basic needs through SCADA attacks,
which could easily replace a conventional attack and either secure or prevent a power transition.
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Proportionality states that the benefits of warfare must outweigh the harms that are
caused by it. Due to the unpredictable nature of cyber attacks, it will be difficult to determine
proportionality. However, a large scale SCADA attack could be considered proportional if there
is limited long-term damage and if it successfully deters further conflict between states.
Overall cyber warfare will have a mitigating effect on a conventional conflict, and this
PTT must be reexamined and updated. Simple economic strength does not translate into military
capabilities anymore, and military power does not directly translate into international prowess
anymore. Another negative of PTT is that it merely assumes that a challenger wants to surpass
the current hegemon. The world system recently left a bipolar world with the collapse of the
Soviet Union leading us into the current unipolar world. Although PTT was written towards the
beginning of the Cold War, long before the fall of the Soviet Union, it does not consider a
continuation of a bipolar or multipolar world. Although it was very likely that only the United
States or Soviet Union would come out of the Cold War as a sole hegemon, it does not mean the
world system is destined to be a unipolar world, especially with the current state of globalization.
Currently the world system is unipolar, but many of the major world powers are entrenched in
massive military alliances and trade deals as well. These military and economic ties cause
stronger bonds between states making conflicts much less likely. The question is: would NATO
back the United States if it entered a conflict with China? Would it risk angering the possible
new hegemon, or risk causing an all-out conflict between the United States backed alliances
versus the China back alliances? These questions fail to be answered by the antiquated PTT.
Although rivalries still occur in the world, such as the current Russian and United States rivalry
that can be seen in the proxy war in Syria, it does not mean these states cannot work together for
common goals. For example, global warming and terrorism are issues that cannot be solved by a
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single unipole; it is going to take a worldwide effort to fix both of these issues. Is it not more
beneficial for a multipolar world to rule? Another possibility is the creation of regional
organizations. Already the European Union has shown it can be a force economically. Although
it has had recent struggles with the strength of the Euro and the situation in Greece, it has
accomplished the most important goal: peace. PTT must be updated in recent years to consider
these possibilities. As stated International Relations theories need to begin to consider cyber
capabilities and until then, the system of international laws will not be sufficient to truly
determine just acts and the true nature of a possible power transition.
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